



THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF US ALLIES OUTSIDE NATO IN DEVELOPING THE SYSTEM OF SAN FRANCISCO

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Introduction

After the Vietnam War, the US position in the Asia-Pacific region weakened significantly. The report of the US Congress on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region in 1978 noted that the states of Southeast Asia are striving to gain independence in ensuring stability and security, and also intend to jointly prevent the region from turning into an arena of superpower rivalry. The regionalization of relations in East Asia was aimed at strengthening state borders, in contrast to European integration, focused on their erosion. Interaction within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, intensified, and the effectiveness of SEATO was increasingly questioned.

A day after the fall of Saigon, on May 1, 1975, the Philippines began negotiations with the United States to revise the 1951 agreement in order to restore its full control over Clark Field and Subic Bay, where American military facilities were based. The Philippine authorities agreed to extend the lease term of the bases, but the very appearance of such discussions indicated that the country was distancing itself from the military partnership with the United States. After two weeks, on May 14, the Thai Government also announced the revision of obligations in bilateral relations. The result of the negotiations was the withdrawal of 23 thousand from Thai territory. U.S. military personnel and the closure of U.S. air bases during 1975. And already in February 1976, Thailand and the Philippines initiated the dissolution of SEATO.

With the coming to power of the first Reagan administration in 1981, the main goals of American policy in the Asia-Pacific region were: containment of the USSR and China, preventing the resumption of economic competition with Japan, strengthening the legal

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the reasons why US position in the Asia-Pacific region weakened, the main goals of American policy in the Asia-Pacific region, framework of the status of "the main non-NATO ally". The article also discusses how the end of the Cold War turned the United States into the only superpower and its consequences on the system of international relations.

framework with regional allies, raising the authority undermined during the Vietnam War, as well as reducing its obligations to ensure security in the region.

The status of the "main non-NATO ally" was chosen as one of the tools for achieving these goals. It was awarded to three states of the region in 1987 – Japan, Australia and South Korea. By the end of the 1980s, Japanese-American relations had entered a new phase. The most significant achievements were: the creation of a powerful strategic US foothold on Japanese territory in order to control military and political processes in the Asia-Pacific region; the progressive growth of the Japanese economy, which allows allocating significant funds for military spending, including the maintenance of American military bases; expansion of trade turnover between the two countries (40% of world GDP and more than 20% of world exports) and the transformation of Japan's national self-defense forces into the most powerful army in the Asia-Pacific region, capable of ensuring not only its own security, but also solving any regional tasks. Among the factors noted, the main reason for assigning Japan the status of "the main non-NATO ally" was the increasing economic power of the Pacific state, which the United States sought to control. Moreover, the US leadership feared that Japan might demand a revision of the 1961 Union treaty, as it spelled out many restrictions on the creation of Japanese national armed forces, independent decision-making on concluding agreements on military issues with third countries, etc..

Thanks to American security guarantees, the defeated state has gained the opportunity to restore the national economy. Basing American military facilities on the territory of Japan has brought the state a lot of profit. The supply of weapons and military equipment for the US army, produced by special orders, supported the Japanese industry. According to US Secretary of State D. Acheson, in the 1950s Japan turned into a "workshop of the world" largely thanks to American assistance.

Despite this, the Japanese society perceived the status of a "major non-NATO ally" ambiguously: on the one hand, the state acquired privileges and benefits, and on the other, the status obliged Japan to pursue a less independent policy and coordinate each of its foreign policy moves with the leadership of the United States.

The new foreign policy course of the Labor Party led by Prime Minister R. Hawke, namely the principle of "self-reliance", largely contributed to the assignment of the status of the OSN of Australia. He implied Australia's adherence to a pro-Western course and close cooperation with the United States to ensure the containment of the USSR's influence in the Pacific Ocean, which fully met the goals of the American administration.

Australia also assumed responsibility for ensuring the security of its own territory. The concept of "self-reliance" did not envisage a transition to neutrality, but had to be implemented within the framework of existing alliances.

A weighty argument in choosing Australia was the danger of the latter's exit from the influence of the United States. The first revision of the ANZUS Treaty of 1983 gave Australia a number of political advantages, and the crisis of allied relations between the United States and New Zealand led to the functioning of the ANZUS practically as a bilateral union. There were also concerns about Hawke's intention to amend its provisions in order to expand guarantees for the Australian side. With the assignment of the status, the military-political bloc continued its activities, and Hawke's intention was never realized. By the end of the 1980s, there were many prerequisites for strengthening cooperation between the United States and South Korea

and awarding it the status of a "major non-NATO ally". The most significant of them were: tensions in relations with North Korea; the growing influence of China in the Asia-Pacific region; the rapid economic growth of South Korea, which contributed to its promotion to the ranks of the most industrially developed countries in the world; the process of democratization, which contributes to increasing the importance of public opinion in the foreign policy of the state. Secretary of State J. By 1985, Schultz had already characterized Korea as "a mature ally and a valiant symbol of resistance to communism."

By the early 1990s, the US allied system in the region had turned into a network of bilateral ties. With the signing of security agreements by the United States with the countries of the region, the so-called "hub and spokes system" (fan system) concept appeared. It is a network of bilateral alliances between the United States and the states of East Asia and differs from the multilateral architecture of building security in Europe. According to the fan system, the "center" or "hub" is the United States, while Asian states such as South Korea and Japan fall under the category of "spokes". The peculiarity of the system is that in the presence of close interaction between the hub and the spokes, there are no connections between the spokes themselves.

A single power center like the North Atlantic Alliance was not formed. Attempts to create one have proved ineffective in practice due to the lack of the necessary level of military, political and technical training of Asian countries. A new element of the established order has become the status of "the main non-NATO ally". It represented a "superstructure" of the existing contractual and legal framework of US bilateral agreements with the states of the region. Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, the readiness of the American administration to develop relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region was manifested not only according to the traditional scheme of bilateral cooperation and interaction on the fields of such regional organizations and blocs as ASEAN and ANZUS, but also within the framework of the status of "the main non-NATO ally". Thanks to this instrument of foreign policy, the United States has strengthened its position in a region that is strategically important from the point of view of its national interests.

The end of the Cold War turned the United States into the only superpower. The Asia-Pacific region was still one of the priorities of US foreign policy, but the need to build up armed forces in the region was not so acute. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the United States, the issue of reducing the American military presence in the region was raised. In 1990, the Ministry of Defense presented to Congress the "East Asian Strategic Initiative" (A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim), in pursuance of which by 1992 the US military contingent in South Korea was reduced by seven thousand people, in Japan – by almost five thousand, the US Air Force base Clark Field in the Philippines was closed.

However, despite the forecasts, the political regime of the DPRK was not eliminated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but on the contrary, intensified programs to create nuclear weapons. Such an aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula has caused the preservation of the US military presence in the region and the strengthening of the system of regional alliances.

According to the 1995 national security strategy, East Asia was declared a zone of "vital" US interests, and North Korea was declared the main threat for pursuing an aggressive policy and developing WMD. As a counteraction to the regional power, it was necessary to strengthen

former ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. The need to strengthen the existing system of alliances was also explained by the desire to contain China, which in the future could turn into a new superpower and, accordingly, into a rival of the United States. The strengthening of the American allied system in the region, consisting of bilateral security treaties backed by the status of a "major non-NATO ally," the United States began with the restoration of the ANZUS bloc. Without it, the security system focused on the new threat posed by the DPRK would be incomplete.

New Zealand was still a member of the military-political bloc, but its status in the ANZUS became nominal after the US lifted its obligations to ensure the country's security. It was necessary to return New Zealand to the ranks of regional allies. A significant role in the establishment of US-New Zealand relations was played by the rapprochement of New Zealand with Australia in the early 1990s. Zealously observing the productive cooperation of these two states, the American side could not cede to Australia the role of "big brother" in relation to New Zealand. However, given the divergence of views of the United States and New Zealand on the issue of nuclear policy, the signing of a new allied treaty on security guarantees was unlikely. The only acceptable tool for Washington to "tame" New Zealand was to assign it the status of a "major non-NATO ally". There were no political and economic obstacles to the implementation of this act in the State Department and Congress. And in 1996, New Zealand became the main US ally outside of NATO. Thus, the trilateral military-political bloc ANZUS was preserved.

The US allied system in the region was also strengthened by the assignment of OSN status to Thailand and the Philippines in 2003. The development of relations with these States was facilitated by the events of September 2001, after which the Bush administration began to expand its involvement in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region. In the report of the American research center RAND Corporation on the US strategy in Asia, along with the terrorist threat, special attention was paid to the growing influence of China. By the early 2000s, its position in East Asia had strengthened - thanks to its own natural resources, it supported sustainable economic growth. Being a self-sufficient center of power, China objectively had all the necessary conditions to guarantee its role as a leader in the region.

The director of the Institute of International Studies of MGIMO, A.A. Sushentsov, in his research notes the close attention of the United States to the increasing military power of China. "Since 2000, the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with other agencies, have annually submitted to the US Congress a report on the Armed Forces and Security Policy of the People's Republic of China." The main bet, according to the Russian political scientist, the United States "is on maintaining the armed forces of the Pacific Command in combat readiness and forward basing them in the Asia-Pacific region." To counter new challenges, the United States needed to expand its military presence in the region, including Southeast Asia. In 2002, the United States and ten ASEAN member countries signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Fight against International Terrorism.

After the events of September 11, 2001, US President George W. Bush Jr. And Thai Prime Minister Ch. Thaksin agreed to conduct coordinated actions to combat terrorism. In the context of the fight against the terrorist threat, Thailand has become a platform for the implementation of military actions by the United States in Asia. Since the main route for the supply of narcotic substances from the "golden triangle" to international markets passed

through the territory of Thailand, the United States and Thailand closely cooperated in the fight against drug trafficking and human trafficking. In gratitude for the support provided in the fight against terrorism, as well as in order to preserve and consolidate its influence in one of the key countries of the region, on December 30, 2003, George W. Bush Jr. He signed a memorandum on assigning Thailand the status of a "major non-NATO ally".

Another Asian State that supported the international coalition against terrorism led by the United States was the Philippines. President G. Arroyo provided the American side with military bases in the Philippines as transit points on the way to Afghanistan. After the fall of S. Hussein's regime, the Philippine government sent a humanitarian contingent to assist the American campaign to rebuild Iraq, and organized a number of joint military exercises with the United States. An agreement on cooperation in the fight against terrorism was reached in November 2001 at a meeting of the Presidents of the two countries.

The Government of the Philippines also conducted an independent organization of anti-terrorist activities in the Asia-Pacific region. One of the first measures was the initiation of a mutual exchange of information with Malaysia and Indonesia. By actions to combat terrorism in its own state and beyond, the Philippines has confirmed the priority of relations with the United States and has shown itself as a reliable ally in the region.

On May 19, 2003, at the meeting of the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines, George W. Bush Jr. He announced his intention to include his partner in the list of major allies outside the alliance. "The assignment of the status of the Philippines OSN will allow our countries to work together in the field of military research and development, and will also provide the Philippine military with broad access to American military equipment and components." On October 6, 2003, the Philippines received the status of a "major non-NATO ally".

In view of the increasing terrorist threat and the growing power of China, a special place in strengthening the US allied system in the Asia-Pacific region was assigned to US-Japanese cooperation. In Japan, a law was passed that allowed the self-defense forces to service the troops of the United States and other foreign countries, conduct rescue, search military operations, etc.. So Japan became a party to the twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions.

In the context of the increasing terrorist threat, the United States has seen in practice the effectiveness of the formed allied system. By providing comprehensive support in the fight against terrorism, the US allied states have shown their readiness to take responsibility for ensuring the security of the region and their commitment to the American foreign policy course. Since the second half of the 2000s, certain changes have begun to occur in American strategic planning. The weight of the Asia-Pacific region in world politics and the economy became increasingly obvious, as well as the rise of China, which, despite proclaiming its commitment to peaceful development, intensively modernized its armed forces.

The main task of the American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region was to prevent the revision of the established order. To this end, it was planned to involve China in the established system of interaction between the Pacific states, "so that it fulfills the roles prepared for it through a combination of incentive incentives and restraining impulses."

The "National Defense Strategy" of 2008 traditionally noted the North Korean threat to the region, but at the same time emphasized the danger posed by the PRC: "In the foreseeable future, we will need to create a barrier to China's growing military modernization and the

impact of its strategic goals on international security." Despite the US military potential, the alleged "barrier" could only be created if the United States joined forces with other states in the region.

In the "US National Security Strategy" of 2010, it was noted that Washington would realize national interests in the Asia-Pacific region through the development of cooperation with allies in the region. The 2011 US National Military Strategy envisaged strengthening ties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand. In October 2011, in the article "The Pacific Century of America" of the magazine "Foreign Affairs", US Secretary of State H. Clinton proposed the "concept of turning" to Asia. "The future of international relations will be determined not in Afghanistan or Iraq, but in Asia, and the United States will be the engine of these changes," she wrote. Later, this concept was called "rebalancing" (rebalancing).

The shift of the balance of US forces to the Asia-Pacific region was approved by Barack Obama in the quadrennial review of defense policy at the. The entire structure of the US presence in the region was still aimed at deterring China. The central part of the "rebalancing" was called the modernization and strengthening of traditional alliances with holders of the status of OSN. The United States has begun to implement a strategy of maintaining its leadership position while transferring more responsibility to the allied states, which will ensure the containment of China based on regional forces. This strategy is based on the concept of "leading from behind", which compares a leader to a shepherd of sheep.

In February 2015, the "National Security Strategy" was published, which emphasized that the leadership of the United States will remain fundamental to the formation of long-term development of the Asia-Pacific region. So, until January 2017 (the end of President Barack Obama's term), the US leadership pursued a political course in the region in the following areas:

- transfer of obligations to ensure regional security, as well as part of military expenditures to the holders of the status of OSN (Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand);
- attracting new partners to cooperation who are concerned about China's growing military and economic power and its position on disputed territories in the South China Sea;
- Strengthening cooperation within the framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Countries.

As the planned tasks were being carried out, the US leadership assumed to "surround" China, forming the so-called "anti-Chinese wall". The implementation of the concept of "rebalancing" began with the strengthening of existing alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. The joint forces of the OSN's regional allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) planned to establish a kind of defense perimeter, which was not possible without external assistance. The quantitative deficit of the composition of the American fleet and the military technical school intended to compensate for the military potential of the allied states of the region.

First of all, cooperation with Japan in the field of missile defense was strengthened, as China and North Korea systematically upgraded their nuclear and missile weapons on a scale exceeding those necessary for their own defense. In 2010, Japan adopted a new national defense program, according to which the state received the opportunity to connect self-defense forces to combat operations. The growth of US arms sales to Japan has increased. Of particular note is the adoption by the United States and Japan of the new "guidelines" for

cooperation in the field of defense (The Guidelines for Japan - U.S. Defense Cooperation) on April 27, 2015. In the event of military action, Japan will become a potential springboard for the forward deployment of American troops and will provide the United States with access to all strategic facilities on its territory, including airports and sea harbors.

The signing of the new guidelines (which replaced the previous agreements of 1997) indicates the intention of the US leadership to strengthen bilateral military-technical cooperation and assign part of the responsibility for ensuring the security of the region to Japan. Adjustments to the "guidelines" became possible after the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of Japan.

As of 2021, the US military contingent in Japan is the largest in the Asia-Pacific region, and ranks second in the world after the NATO Armed Forces stationed in Germany. Currently, about 47 thousand military personnel are located at 90 military facilities in Japan. The main headquarters of the 7th Operational Fleet of the US Navy, the Air Force bases "Misawa", "Kadena" and "Yokota", the US MP Futenma Air Station, the Marine Corps Base "Iwakuni", etc. are stationed here. The island of Okinawa (approximately 74.7% of all US military facilities) is of strategic importance due to its proximity to the Korean Peninsula and China. The cost of maintaining the bases will be borne by the Government of Japan. According to the terms of the agreement concluded in 2015, their size in the period from 2016 to 2020 totaled 946.5 billion. yen (8.93 billion). The volume of expenditures in the 2021 fiscal year will amount to 201.7 billion. yen (about \$1.9 billion).

Another proof of the strengthening of allied relations in the Asia-Pacific region is the military exercises conducted by the United States (Talisman Sabre, Cobra Gold, Key Resolve, Multi-Sail, Ssang Yong, Balikatan, etc.). Operational and combat training events are held, in particular, to demonstrate the combined military potential of China and North Korea.

The basis of the naval forces of South Korea is a powerful shipbuilding industry, which ranks second in the world (China is the first, Japan is the third). About 30 thousand military personnel are stationed at American military bases in South Korea (according to data at the beginning of 2021) under the pretext of preventing possible aggression from the DPRK. Among the military facilities are the Kunsan and Osan Air Force bases, the Chinhe Naval Command, etc. The maintenance of American bases is also fully paid for by South Korea.

In 2016, Korea joined the US missile defense system, it was announced the deployment of mobile complexes on the peninsula for high-altitude trans-atmospheric interception of missiles (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD), directed against the threat from the DPRK. The process of strengthening the US alliance system in the region also affected the military ties of the American side with the Philippines. In 2013, the Filipino Defense Minister V. Gazmin and his Japanese counterpart I. Onodera agreed to deploy a joint military base in order to prevent "China's expansionist role in the region." On April 28, 2014, an "Agreement on expanded defense cooperation" was signed in Manila, according to which American troops receive permanent access to a number of military bases in the Philippines with the possibility of deploying combat aircraft and ships there.

The use of New Zealand ports is also an integral part of the US security system directed against China. The U.S. conflict with New Zealand over nuclear weapons has never been fully resolved, although relations have continued to improve and the two countries have expanded military cooperation. For example, in 2001, New Zealand sent troops to participate in the US-

led war in Afghanistan. In 2010 and 2012, the parties signed two Union declarations – Wellington and Washington. The agreements reached an agreement on strengthening ties, established regular meetings of ministers and annual negotiations on military and political issues of common interest: Antarctica (environmental protection, scientific research), the Asia-Pacific region (ensuring stability and security), the fight against terrorism and countering the proliferation of WMD, free trade at the international level through the WTO and at the regional level through APEC.

In 2016, the New Zealand Navy invited the destroyer USS Sampson to dock, it was the first docking of an American warship since New Zealand took over. It is unlikely that the state will repeal its anti-nuclear legislation in the near future. However, the strengthening of ties with the United States indicates an interest in cooperation, primarily in the containment of China. Like other major non-NATO allies, Australia has taken measures to modernize its naval forces, involving the implementation of programs: "JP 2048", "SEA 4000" and "SEA 1000". In 2011, the parties agreed to jointly use part of Australia's island territorial possessions in the Indian and Southern Oceans, in particular, with the aim of deploying American unmanned aerial vehicles there, which can be used in the event of a threat from China. In 2014, an agreement was signed to expand military cooperation for a period of twenty-five years. The document notes the intention of the United States to quantitatively increase its presence at the Australian Robertson Barracks base in Darwin, the location of which allows you to control Southeast Asia. Currently, there are only two US military bases in Australia – the Pine Gap surveillance Station and the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station.

As of 2021, the main "defense perimeter" of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region consists of six states, each of which has the status of a major non-NATO ally - Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines.

Considering the above, it should be noted that the Obama administration has achieved significant results in its allied policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The San Francisco subsystem was supplemented by six holders of the status of "main non-NATO ally". Thanks to the OSN tool, the ANZUS block and bilateral security agreements with the States of the region were preserved. The alliance agreements concluded during the Cold War have now lost their former significance due to the disappearance of the threat of the spread of communism. However, the United States, with the help of the "main non-NATO ally" status, managed not only to preserve existing allied relations, but also to adapt them to the conditions of the modern military-political situation. None of the treaties concluded between the United States and the states of the region in the period from 1951 to 1960 has lost its force largely due to the presence of the status. The latter, carrying more abstract ideas about a potential enemy, security guarantees and benefits, was a kind of "backup" and even, to a certain extent, a replacement for existing union treaties.

Conclusion

The main result of the reorientation of the San Francisco system from preventing the revival of Japan's military and political power to confrontation with China was the final formation by the United States of the allies' power perimeter. During the Cold War, it was designed to create a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In the post-bipolar period, the power perimeter was transformed and expanded in the face of a new threat. It should also be noted that with the change in the political goal of the alliance, the leadership role of the United States has been

preserved largely due to the status of "the main ally outside NATO". Today, the combined potential of the United States and the allied states of the region exceeds the strategic power of China.

A significant achievement of the activation of the United States' foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region was to minimize the costs of the American administration by gradually transferring responsibility for the security of the region to its main allies, sharing responsibilities with them and material costs for military and other needs.

When following the planned course, there was a high probability of an early institutionalization of the security system in the Asia-Pacific region. A correction to the plans of the Obama administration was made by the new US President Donald Trump, who took office on January 20, 2017. Two days after the inauguration, the head of state signed a memorandum on launching the process of the US withdrawal from the TPP. In his opinion, the provisions of the agreement infringed on the opportunities of a nationally-oriented business. The withdrawal of the largest importer from the agreement called into question its continued existence, since the United States accounted for almost 14% of the total global supply of goods. On March 8, 2018, the partnership was revived in the form of a "Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership", which was signed by all participants of the US TTPCROM.

Thus, D. Trump's refusal to participate in the Trans-Pacific led to a redistribution of forces in the Asia-Pacific region and the strengthening of intraregional ties. Ultimately, Obama's goal of creating multilateral cooperation to ensure the stability and security of the Pacific Ocean will be achieved by Trump, only by other means and with fewer losses. Unlike Barack Obama, Trump is determined to respect the economic interests of the state while maintaining the previous ambitions. The foreign policy course of the new president will help reduce the cost of military presence by withdrawing part of the contingent of the national armed forces from the region. Moreover, the United States will retain influence in the region through arms exports, which will provide additional jobs and infusion into the national economy. Despite withdrawing from the TPP, Trump had no intention of leaving the strategically important region. This, in particular, is evidenced by his statement during the inaugural speech: "We will strengthen our former alliances and create new ones."

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