



ACTIVITIES OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN AND THEIR CENTRALIZATION (1925-1930)

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ABSTRACT

The issue of human resources in the industrial policy of the Soviet period in Uzbekistan in 1925-1930, their national imbalances and the essence of the Soviet policy of "mobilization", the work done for the selection and training of workers, problems, lessons are covered on the basis of archival documents and sources.

Introduction. During the Soviet era, the policy of industrialization led to the formation of a working class. Workers sent from the union were used to train locally qualified personnel. The policy of centralization hindered the full development of the economy of the Uzbek SSR. Although industrialization has created a powerful manufacturing sector throughout the union, it has also led to the weakening of industries that serve to increase consumption and living standards..

Literature review. R.Murtazoeva, K.Rajabov, D.Alimova, R.Abdullaev, D.Ziyaeva, B.Hasanov, D.Bobojonova, Q.Abdurahmanov, Yu.Ergasheva, R.Bazarboev, A.Golovanov, G.Shister R.X.Aminova T.Melnikova, N.Muhiddinov,

A.K.Valiev, Sh.Ziyomov, X.Tursunov, T.Toshmurodov, N.Axmedov, M.Pak F.Oripov, T.Abdushukurov, M.Gurevich, Sh.A.Zuxriddinov, G.Ismoilova, M.A.Axunova, F.Iskhakov, O.K.Ziyadullaev, Sh.Rashidov, N.Rahmonov, K.Tuychiev, S.I.Gitlin and other historians in this field. It should be noted. In this study, one of the most complex and controversial issues in the history of Uzbekistan, the Soviet era, is studied in a new way, free from any ideology, one-sidedly and objectively.

Research Methodology. The methodological guidelines and recommendations of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev on the development of the history of Uzbekistan were used to determine the



theoretical and conceptual basis of the study. The research used historical, systematic, statistical, systematic analysis, comparative analysis and problem-periodic approaches.

Analysis and results. After the formation of the Uzbek SSR, in December 1925, the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) announced the intensification of the path of "socialist industrialization." The party's secretary general, I. Stalin, said that "... true industrialization consists in the development of heavy industries, manufactured goods, primarily machinery"[1]. At the same time, the Center has done some work to centralize the economy of the republic. The policy of centralization hindered the full development of the economy of the Uzbek SSR. Although industrialization has created a powerful manufacturing sector throughout the union, it has also led to the weakening of industries that serve to increase consumption and living standards. Industrialization in Uzbekistan was initially slow. Because handicrafts were a priority. The issue of funding for the rapid industrialization of the country has caused a sharp debate. Proponents of accelerating industrialization put forward a plan to raise funds at the expense of agriculture, while the opposition, in support of the industrialization policy, proposed that it be carried out in conjunction with the gradual voluntary implementation of co-operation in agriculture, improving the material well-being of the population. After a heated political debate, it was decided to get the money from the agricultural sector. The Uzbek economy was agrarian. Centralization prevented the consideration of economic opportunities and made it

possible to create one-sided economic complexes in the form of guidelines. One of the experts on economic issues at the time, I. Kriktsov, "The issue was resolved directly in accordance with the principle of national boundaries, closely related to the economic nature of the newly created individual states"[2]. In consultation with the Bolshevik Party, it was decided that "Uzbekistan will be only a peasant republic, Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) - a peasant republic, Turkmenistan - a wine and cattle republic, and Kyrgyzstan (Kazakhstan) - a republic of cattle"[3].

The years under study were a period of strengthening the political and economic position of the Soviet government. The industrialization policy pursued in Uzbekistan in 1925-1940 was an integral and integral part of the chauvinist and colonial policy of the Soviet government and the Communist Party. At the heart of this policy was the specialization of all the allied republics and their inclusion in the single all-Union system of the national economy.

At the II Congress of Soviets of Uzbekistan (March 1927) on the basis of the Industrialization Program of the Union, the formation of the textile industry in the republic, the creation of new branches of the agricultural processing industry, the development and implementation of electrification plans, set up plans and programs for the development of the construction industry[4]. He also stated at the III Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (November 1927) that "the main goal of industrialization of the USSR is the need to directly build industrial facilities, on the one hand, and active participation in the industrialization of the USSR on the other"[4]. A large part of the



funds allocated for the industry of Uzbekistan is allocated to all Central Asian republics. If we take it as 100%, then from 1925 to 1928 Uzbekistan received 56%, Turkmenistan - 28%, Kyrgyzstan - 14%, Tajikistan - 2%[6].

The production councils and commissions established in the early stages of industrialization have become a tried and tested school for workers to approach certain issues of production in their enterprises from a state point of view. The Center's policy of "trying to eradicate illiteracy" towards the people was also related to the issue of personnel serving the interests of the country. This led to the idea that later in the training of personnel should be selected people who are class-confident, from the "working" segments of the population. The promotion of advanced workers to leadership positions was carried out extensively by trade unions and Komsomol organizations. In 1923-1925, the Tashkent Food Industry Workers' Union promoted 21 people to production management, and by 1926 this number had risen to 24[7].

In addition, the personnel sent from the center to different regions of the Union acted reluctantly to understand the mentality of the republic and indifferent to the national values of the population. In order to justify such a policy, the idea of a single economic complex of the USSR was put forward. Moscow was in charge of deciding which sectors of the economy to develop in Uzbekistan. This direction of development is reflected in the directives of the Stalinist Five-Year Plan. In 1924, about 600 highly skilled workers were sent to Uzbekistan from the more industrialized central regions of the USSR, and this figure

has been growing year by year. In Russia itself, Ukraine, Belarus and other republics have focused on the construction of heavy industry, while in Uzbekistan, light industry enterprises have been established to produce food, clothing, etc., which are related to the development of the cotton industry. The growth of the industry was also noticeable. In 1925, 118 enterprises were divided into 21 industries, and by 1928, 166 enterprises were divided into 35 industries. 13 of them were in the ginning industry. The remaining enterprises are Solrokho ozokerite producer, repair plant of the Tashkent Cotton Committee, Andijan and Asaka oil and soap factories, silk factories in Samarkand[8]. Certain enterprises for industrial production have been established in the country, and funds have been allocated from the budget, including efforts to form a working class with the help of the central industrial districts. During the first five-year plans, 173 million soums were allocated for the construction of industrial enterprises in Uzbekistan. rubles were later allocated 226 million rubles, finally a total of 350 million rubles due to demand from the industry. rubles were required. As a result, Uzbekistan, like the Allied republics, has become an industrialized republic, but specializes in the production of raw materials. But all this was directed at the imperial center and then at the imperial interests of the Allies. The national natural resources of the Uzbek people, its labor, were constantly subjugated to serve the dictatorial-imperial regime.

In the early years of industrialization in Uzbekistan, of course, it was natural to distinguish it from other relatively industrialized republics due to the low



cultural and technical level of the population, the lack of workers, engineers and technicians from the local population. This situation was supplemented by the number of workers from the RSFSR. In general, the main source of labor in all sectors of the economy was replenished at the expense of urban and rural unemployed. In general, the main source of employment in all sectors of the economy was replenished at the expense of urban and rural unemployed. As a result, by 1928, unemployment had risen. It was manifested in two main reasons — the shift of the rural population to more industrial, commercial, and handicraft industrial cooperatives, and the large influx of unemployed in the European part of the Union. In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the number of unemployed in these years amounted to 75-85 thousand people. According to the National Security Committee of the Uzbek SSR, the number of unemployed on October 1, 1926 was 20,356, 1927, January 1, 1923 25633, April 1, 30398, July 1, 24576, October 1, 27928 people[9]. Unemployment growth was mainly at the expense of unskilled workers. With the number of unemployed in the republic so high, the influx of labor from abroad continued. In this regard, the chairman of the IFC F.Khodjaev, in his speeches, said that despite the development of industry, agriculture, trade, the reason for the rise in unemployment was the unemployed from imported and old cities. It is often pointed out that many of them are artisans, artisans and unemployed who are now joining the ranks of workers, and that measures to prevent unemployment have not yet been developed. Unemployment benefits in 1926-1927 amounted to 1,379 thousand rubles, in 1927-28 - 2659

thousand, in 1929 - 4360 thousand rubles[10]. Unemployment during this period was predominantly female. During this period, there were an average of 537 unemployed women per thousand working insured women. In the early years of industrialization, the demand for women's labor was low[11]. Often the demand for labor did not match the supply. The point is that the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labor was always strong, but often the unskilled, unemployed population would apply for more jobs. The situation of artisans in the cities was dire. The forced voluntary transfer of small manual labor enterprises to the state will result in the formation of cooperatives, which will require artisans to receive raw materials from the state and hand over their finished products to the state.

In April 1927, Fayzulla Khodjaev, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, wrote in a letter to IA Zelensky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and First Secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): fantastically structured. This plan does not fit the level of our capabilities, nor the demand and scale of the means at our disposal. Also, this economic plan is designed in such a way that it does not correspond to our real capabilities, experience, development of the national economy. That's why I think Burnashev's position is wrong and false"[12]. Such fairly sharp views of national leaders were not in the interests of the Center. F. Khodjaev was constantly pressured by the above representatives.

Speaking at the III Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (November



16-24, 1927), Abdurahim Hojibayev, one of the national leaders on industrial development in Uzbekistan, said: "Our Central Asian republics have always been and will remain a raw material base for the Union. If we raise the issue of industrial development of the industry, first of all, the main focus will be on the direction of processing raw materials and using our domestic potential. However, this does not mean that the establishment of light industry in Uzbekistan, the expansion of the construction of textile mills will not be raised[13]. At this congress, many views were expressed on the scale of production in Uzbekistan. Large groups of workers and specialists are regularly sent from Russia to Uzbekistan for permanent residence. They were to help accelerate industrial construction and form a republican working-class detachment. Uzbekistan has begun to implement a policy of industrialization as a necessary condition for strengthening Soviet power. Industrialization has been difficult in a country with backward industry, almost no skilled workers, almost no specialists, and no experience in developing heavy industry. Under this pretext, skilled workers, engineers and technicians were evacuated from the central regions of Russia. More than 170 companies from Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Donbass, Kiev, Baku and Minsk took part in the construction of the Chirchik electrochemical plant[14]. Workers sent from the union were used to train locally qualified personnel. This was necessary for the formation of the proletarian class in the transition of "backward" peoples from capitalism to socialism. Since 1924, about 600 workers came to Uzbekistan, and this figure has been

growing every year. In 1926, 40 Uzbek young men were sent to Uzbekistan to study industrial work in the central regions of the Union, including each of the two factories in Reutovsk and Zaraysk. In addition, 100 spinners and 100 seamstresses from the local population of Uzbekistan were sent to industrial enterprises in Moscow for the Red East factory. [15]. It was the center's "grateful help" in those days. The center, with the help of industrial factories, made efforts to form a working class. However, all this was in the interests of the ruling Bolshevik Party and the Center. The national natural resources of the Uzbek people, its labor, were constantly directed to serve the Soviet regime. At the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (November 1925), the leadership of the republic openly stated at the congress that it was necessary to revive the textile industry, primarily to meet the needs of the local population in textiles, as well as their supply to neighboring countries[16]. The government of the young republic, led by Fayzulla Khodjaev, rightly thought that if appropriate economic assistance was provided, Uzbekistan would be able to independently process its own raw materials, produce finished products, and establish direct foreign economic relations[17]. In 1927, the share of agriculture in the national economy of the USSR was 62.6%, the share of industry was 37.4%, while 90% of industrial production was based on the processing of agricultural raw materials. As the economy was in the direction of raw materials, the industry of the republic was specialized only in one direction. Moreover, the policy of industrialization was carried out at the expense of the village. Purchase prices for



agricultural products have been reduced. As a result, the population became poorer and the food problem in the country worsened. In this view, with the onset of industrialization, it seemed as if practical measures were being taken to address this urgent task. In his speech at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1927, Sergo Ordzhonikidze was forced to admit that 61.9% of the Soviet administration in Uzbekistan were Russians, and only 24.7% were indigenous peoples[18]. In 1925, the industrial enterprises in the territory of Uzbekistan were mainly light industrial enterprises, including 39 ginneries and 35 food enterprises. In total, they employed 87,000 workers. The bulk of the workers were workers from the center. In particular, 2.1% of local workers and 0.6% of skilled workers worked at the Pervomaisky workshop in Tashkent. Out of 2,438 employees at 5 enterprises in Tashkent's Krasno Vostochny district, 5% were local workers[19]. At that time, an ordinary worker in a cement plant was paid 51 rubles and 50 tiyins, and a worker in a garment factory was paid 40 rubles and 51 tiyins[20]. By 1930, workers' wages had risen to 87 rubles [21]. But as workers' wages rose, so did the devaluation of money. State prices for food and industrial goods have increased tenfold [22]. By the end of the first five years (October 1928-December 1932), real wages paid to workers and employees had fallen by at least 20%. In 1932, the average pension for workers was 32.9 soums [23]. This was not enough to meet human needs at all. Moreover, many segments of society did not exercise their right to pensions and benefits in practice. It was extremely important for Uzbekistan to accelerate industrial

construction. Because the economy of the republic remained agrarian. In 1927, the share of agriculture in the national economy of Uzbekistan was 62.6%, the share of industry was 38.4%, while 90% of industrial production was based on the processing of agricultural raw materials [24]. In 1925/1926, the number of workers reached 11,900[25]. 29.3% of them were indigenous peoples [26]. The total number of workers and laborers in the national economy of Uzbekistan in 1926 amounted to 148 thousand people, in 1928 - 173 thousand, and in 1940 - 756 thousand people[27]. Although the development of the industry led to the rapid growth of the working class, there was a shortage of qualified personnel[28]. The process of staffing the industry has become controversial. In general, the rapid pace of industrialization has created objective conditions for the quantitative growth of the supply of workers and engineers. For example, the number of working class in large industry increased from 17.9 thousand in the first 5 years to 62.4 thousand people, or 3.5 times. In particular, Akmal Ikramov, in his speech on the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (b) at his congress in Samarkand on November 16-26, 1927, stated that the number of indigenous workers decreased from 38.4% in 1926 to 37.4% in 1927[29]. In 1927, out of 1,500 workers in the state apparatus and central offices, only 317 were indigenous. Mustafa Chokay: "Let's put aside other high-tech positions, not a single Turkestan train driver, not a single railway station chief or assistant. In the metallurgical industry, there were 3,627 foreigners and 819 indigenous people[30]. It can be seen that in



some institutions only employees of other nationalities sent from the center worked, while employees of local nationalities were not hired under various pretexts. For example, the new Tashkent city executive committee did not hire local workers. It was noted that it was not possible to hire interns on the pretext that the cost was not taken into account when drafting the budget[31]. During the first five years (1928-1932), 289 industrial enterprises were built and put into operation in Uzbekistan. 79 enterprises were reorganized, the main production assets of the industry increased by 3 times, oil production by 2.5 times, metallurgical products by 6 times. The rates of light industry, leather, footwear, sewing and yarn production have been steadily increasing[32]. During this period, Tashselmash and Quvasoy cement plants, the first cotton machine-building industries in Central Asia, were built. The construction of "Chirchikqurilish" and the Tashkent Textile Combine was carried out at a rapid pace. The development of industry required the expansion of the energy base. New power plants have been built in Fergana, Samarkand, Tashkent and other places. In 1932, the number of all power stations increased from 16 in 1928 to 49, and power generation increased more than 7 times. Fergana textile factory and oil refinery, sewing factories were launched in Bukhara, Tashkent and other cities. Due to the fact that the economy was based on raw materials, Uzbek industry was specialized only in one direction: about two-thirds of it was accounted for by the ginning industry. The working class was the main social force of the Soviet government. The technical level of industrial enterprises in Uzbekistan was extremely low, and there was a severe

shortage of engineers, technicians, and skilled workers who knew modern equipment. Skilled workers and experienced workers were brought to the industrial enterprises from the central cities of the RSFSR. As indigenous peoples became a minority, many industrial specialists from the Allied republics, mainly from Russia, began to come to help train them. Workers from leading enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo, Serpukha and other Russian cities have also provided significant assistance in the technical equipment of light industry in Uzbekistan and the training of local personnel. The main forms of this activity were: training of local workers through experienced Russian instructors, ensuring the participation of Russian workers in group and individual training, parenting experience of backward workers, the establishment of schools and clubs to train young workers in central Russian cities. In total, in 1925-1930, about 10,000 skilled workers were trained for the light industry of Uzbekistan on the basis of Russian production centers[33]. It should be noted that the curricula and educational work in educational institutions, textbooks were highly politicized, aimed at alienating the people from the centuries-old cultural heritage. Such a method of loss was based on the principles of cultivating executives who disregarded the interests of the nation and did not leave the reins of the Soviet political leadership. From 1926 to 1940, the population of Uzbekistan increased by 750,000 people or more than 10% due to newcomers. The center's interest in resettlement of the Russian-speaking population was to create its own basic social stratum in the national lands and to implement a policy of Russification. [34].



The center's interest in resettlement of the Russian-speaking population was to create its own basic social stratum in the national lands and to implement a policy of Russification[35]. New production lines have emerged. Due to the constant sending of workers from the central cities of the Union, little attention was paid to the training of personnel in the republic. As a result, production declined and plans were not fulfilled on time. Also, not being able to choose the right workers has often led to negative consequences. Because not all of the workers sent from the center were qualified. As a result, such workers were fired for failing to perform their duties, including at the Khilkovo factories due to a lack of attention to workers and a lack of housing[36].

In 1928, the 2nd regional conference of the Tashkent district on the Soviet apparatus and the nationalization of industry was held. It was noted that the training of proletarian cadres from the local population in the involvement of workers in the building of the Soviet state and their service to the interests of the local population in Soviet public organizations had been achieved. In addition, it was noted at the party conference that there are some shortcomings in the practical work on the localization of industries and organizations. F. Khodjaev said at the 11th Congress of Engineers and Technicians of Uzbekistan (July 11, 1928): "Some industry leaders are preventing the promotion of young leaders." [37]. In particular, a) the inadequacy of the involvement of local workers in the Soviet apparatus; b) the lack of a systematic calculation of local unemployment in the context of high unemployment among the local population;

v) Insufficient attention paid by the heads of certain organizations and institutions to the training of the local population and workers serving their interests in the Soviet apparatus and industry; d) there is a lack of qualified staff (agronomists, doctors, engineers, legal consultants) among the local population and a very small number of qualified staff [38]. It is obvious that the localization of government agencies is not well organized. The example of archival documents shows that the officials in charge also looked at the case from the sidelines. In order to justify the lack of control over localization and the negligence of some European leaders, Zelensky, the head of the Central Asian bureau of the Russian Communist Party, said: "Many comrades think that localization means handing over the entire administration to the local people, or that they can participate in the government in a way that is commensurate with the amount. Giving meaning in this way is nothing more than a view of national chauvinism. Localization is nothing more than bringing the government apparatus closer to the interests of the local people. This rapprochement can also be achieved by the Russians learning the local language" [39]. Thus, in the national policy of the Soviet government in Uzbekistan, it was determined that the issue of localization of new government agencies would also serve the interests of the Bolsheviks. The number of workers was to be brought from the central cities of the RSFSR. This method of the center has been continued throughout the history of Uzbekistan throughout the Soviet era [40]. In 1930, 43 out of 97 people working in the MIC of the USSR were indigenous. All employees of the Uzbek Supply Trust were



of European descent[41]. Indigenous peoples were not in line with the center's political goals. It appears that the staff at the center worked more in government offices. It was natural for such leaders to defend the interests of the center. In Uzbekistan, professional development courses were organized for industrial workers. In such courses, the party's program of not forming the political and legal consciousness of the local nation's leading workers was an important tool in practice. That is why the Bolsheviks, through their methods of propaganda and administrative command, tried to increase the share of local national workers in the Soviets year by year, not the leading cadres.

In the second five-year period, the industrial enterprises to be built in Uzbekistan were planned taking into account the needs of the Center, rather than local conditions and national interests. For example, the construction of a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Chirchik and the Tashkent Textile Combine was aimed at developing cotton growing in Central Asia. In the second five years, 189 industrial enterprises and power plants were built. These include the Fergana spinning mill, Khavdag, Uchqizil oil fields, the Tashkent printing plant, the Kokand superphosphate plant, the thermal power plant in Bukhara, the Kadyriya and Burjar stations, the Tashkent paint and varnish plant, and others. During this period, unemployment rose from the central regions of the RSFSR to industrial facilities in Uzbekistan (but during this period, ie by 1930, government programs considered the unemployment problem in the whole Union to be over.) Many skilled and non-skilled workers were sent to the republic. In particular, in 1933 -

3062 people, in 1934 - 3500 people, in 1935 - 3000 workers were sent[42]. It is true that in the 1920s the import of European workers and specialists was in the economic interests of the republic, that is, during the years of industrialization, Uzbekistan laid the foundation for the training of national workers. Much attention was also paid to the involvement of local nationalities, in particular, Uzbek women in industrial production. However, the quality of vocational training of workers and their social and living conditions were neglected. This has led to high levels of staff turnover. Excessive attraction of workers from the central regions of the former Soviet Union to the republic is also a serious obstacle to the growth of the national working group of Uzbekistan in terms of quantity and quality. Lack of modern production methods in industry, low level of equipment, administrative management of planned economy laws, staff level and incompetence are mostly unsatisfactory, widespread use of administrative measures of violence in production - all this has negatively affected not only industry but the economy as a whole. Significant work has been done in the training of specialists. In 1928, there were 15,320 workers in the state's industrial sectors, 51% of whom were indigenous workers[43]. At the same time, there has been a revival in the process of workers' participation in government, economic and industrial enterprises. This has played an important role in providing various industries with enthusiastic leaders, talented organizers, production commanders. Many workers were elected as engineers and managers of the largest industrial enterprises in the country. For example, worker Said Khodjaev became the



first Uzbek to become an electrical engineer[44], worker Mukhtor Saidov became manager of the Santo oil field [45]. In the Tashkent district alone, in July-August 1928, 268 workers were promoted to industrial positions by trade unions, 108 of whom were indigenous[46]. As of October 1, 1929, a total of 232 engineers and technicians had worked in industry, of whom only 94 had higher and 95 had secondary special education, and the rest were practitioners. By 1937, their number had grown to 6,000[47]. By the end of 1940, 649,000 workers and employees were employed in the national economy of Uzbekistan. 5.3 thousand engineers with higher education and 6.1 thousand secondary special technical workers worked in industrial production.

Conclusion/Recommendations. As a result of the research, it became clear that although Uzbekistan made an important contribution to the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of its economic independence, it remained a supplier of raw materials and the issue of human resources was also addressed. The process of formation of industrial personnel in Uzbekistan was based on an extensive way of artificially accelerating industrial construction, reflecting the specifics of the regional location of productive forces in the interests of the ruling Center, reflecting the internal contradictions of national personnel policy pursued by the Soviet leadership. The main sources of filling the working class were the unemployed, peasants, housewives, young people.

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